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THE MISCONCEIVED ASSUMPTION ABOUT 
CONSTITUTIONAL ASSUMPTIONS
Randy E. Barnett*
INTRODUCTION
Whether or not they are originalists, most constitutional scholars and 
observers assume that the basic assumptions held at the time the Constitution was 
enacted or amended are relevant to ascertaining its original meaning.  Some 
originalists use constitutional assumptions to constrain judges in their 
interpretations of the more abstract passages of the text.  Others reject originalism 
precisely because they object to the outmoded assumptions that prevailed at the 
time of enactment, and they assume that these assumptions must shape the 
original meaning of the text.  
For example, some claim that because of widespread concern about the 
continued vitality of the militia, the original meaning of the Second Amendment’s 
right to keep and bear arms is limited to those who are in service to the militia.  
Others think that because many in the Thirty-Ninth Congress and elsewhere 
assumed the continued existence of segregated government schools or the 
inferiority of women, the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment must be 
consistent with segregated schools and the common law rules of coverture.  Still 
others claim that because people assumed at the time the Fourteenth Amendment 
was adopted that laws regulating private morality were within the police power of 
the states, such laws must be consistent with its original meaning.  
In this Article, I challenge this misconceived assumption about the 
constitutional status of basic assumptions, which derives from a mistaken 
conflation of constitutions and contracts.  Because the shared background 
assumptions of the parties are relevant to the enforcement of written contracts, it 
seems natural to treat written constitutions the same way.  This equation of 
contracts and constitutions is further invited by the widespread and often 
unexamined assumption that, like contracts, constitutions are legitimate if and 
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2only if they are the product of consent.  Because the shared background 
assumptions shape the scope of the parties’ consent to written contracts, so too it 
is assumed that background assumptions shape the meaning of written 
constitutions.
But constitutions are not contracts.  Contracts are consensual agreements 
between identifiable persons that provide a private law to govern their 
relationship.  Constitutions inevitably lack the consent that legitimates contracts.  
Unlike contracts, from the time they are enacted into an indefinite future,
constitutions purport to bind countless numbers of persons who do not consent.  
Or more precisely, statutes enacted pursuant to constitutions purport to bind 
members of the public who have not themselves consented to be bound.  
Therefore, if such statutes are binding, it is because of something other than the 
literal consent of the governed.  And, unlike contracts that can “fail” when their 
basic assumptions turn out to be untrue, with constitutions failure is not an option
Constitutional scholars have yet to systematically examine the lessons that 
can be learned from a close comparison of the important similarities and equally 
important differences between written constitutions and contracts.  In this Article, 
I begin to fill this gap.  Doing so requires recognizing three fundamental 
distinctions that are often overlooked in constitutional theory and practice: (1) the 
difference between express and implied in fact terms, (2) the difference between 
ambiguous and vague terms, and (3) the difference between constitutional 
interpretation and constitutional construction.
In Part I, I explain how express and implied-in-fact terms provide the 
meaning of both written contracts and written constitutions.  In Part II, I 
distinguish the express and implied meaning of the text from the background 
assumptions that can condition the enforceability of a contract.  Although 
background assumptions cannot vary this meaning, they can be relevant to 
interpreting the meaning of genuinely ambiguous terms in both contracts and 
constitutions.  Most sustained disputes over constitutional terms concern terms 
that are vague, rather than ambiguous.  Whether background assumptions may 
also be used to add specificity to vague terms in constitutions, as they can when 
construing contracts, will depend on one’s theory of constitutional construction.  
In Part III, I explore how one’s approach to constitutional construction 
will depend on one’s theory of constitutional legitimacy.  That the legitimacy of 
constitutions, unlike contracts, is not based on original consent entails that 
original background assumptions do not affect the construction of constitutions 
the way they do contracts.  Finally, in Part IV, I apply this analysis to three 
different background assumptions: (1) that there are background unenumerated 
3natural rights, (2) that there is an unenumerated police power of the states, and (3) 
that the original meaning of the Constitution includes the interpretive methods 
that those who approved the Constitution assumed would be used.
I.  CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING
A.  The Similarities and Differences Between Contracts and Constitutions
Constitutions are not contracts.  With a contract, all parties must consent 
to be bound.1  With a constitution, this is impossible.  Constitutions must 
necessarily lack the unanimous consent of all persons upon whom they are 
imposed.2  Despite this crucial difference in why they are binding, written 
constitutions nevertheless resemble written contracts in important respects.  Most 
obviously, both involve the use of writings to communicate a discernable meaning 
that is supposed to remain the same until it is properly changed.  In other words, 
the terms of both contracts and constitutions are put in writing to “lock in” or fix a 
meaning at the time of formation, one that can in turn be ascertained after 
formation.  The audience for the fixed meaning of a contract is, first and foremost, 
the parties themselves, but third parties including courts may also need to know 
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4what a written contract means, especially if a dispute over its performance arises.
Of course, the ability to lock in or fix a meaning by using a writing is 
limited by the inherent imprecision of language, by the far-from-perfect 
knowledge and foresight of the drafters, and by the motivations that sometimes 
exist for the drafters of either contracts or constitutions to obfuscate rather than 
confront disagreements.  For these and other reasons, the meaning of both written 
contracts and constitutions is inevitably incomplete or “underdeterminate.”  But 
the underdeterminacy of a writing should not be confused with radical 
indeterminacy.3  Language does communicate—however imperfectly—and some 
of its imperfections may be anticipated and guarded against.  After all, were it 
impossible to communicate by writing, the journal in which this article appears
would not exist, and we would not be inundated by written agreements throughout 
all aspects of our lives.
Although written constitutions and contracts have at least this much in 
common, their differences are also significant.  Most importantly, unlike contracts 
to which all parties must manifest their assent, constitutions are not and cannot be 
founded on unanimous consent.4  Whereas contracts are created to provide a 
“private law” that binds the parties, constitutions are made to provide a “public 
law” that binds those who govern a nonconsenting population.  In other words, 
unlike contracts that govern the relationship of consenting parties, constitutions 
are designed to govern those who claim the power to rule others who have not 
consented to being ruled—at least not in the sense of the actual manifested 
consent we attribute to contracting parties.5  Finally, whereas written contracts are 
normally—though not always—designed to last for a relatively limited length of 
time, constitutions are expected to last indefinitely. 
B.  Contractual Meaning: Express and Implied-in-Fact Terms
In this section, I consider an important similarity between the meaning of 
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5written contracts and constitutions: the reliance on express and implied-in-fact 
terms.  In this regard, contract law theory can illuminate constitutional theory.
Contract law distinguishes expressed from implied-in-fact contracts.  As 
summarized by Murray: “A contract is said to be ‘express’ when it has been stated 
in oral or written words, as distinguished from an ‘implied-in-fact’ contract in 
which the undertaking is inferred from conduct other than the speaking or writing 
of words.”6  Murray then proceeds to question the usefulness of the distinction on 
the ground that “[a]ll true contracts are necessarily express contracts, in that they 
must arise out of an express intention.”7  Murray thinks that using the term 
“implied-in-fact” to refer to an intention that has been expressed in ways other 
than through the use of language confuses the real issue “which is in all cases one 
of determining whether an intention to assume the alleged undertaking has been 
manifested in some way.”8
The source of the alleged confusion to which Murray refers is that the 
contract law distinction between “express” and “implied-in-fact” is used in two 
different, but related, contexts.  On the one hand, we speak of express or implied-
in-fact contracts; on the other hand, we speak of express or implied-in-fact terms
of a contract.  The first of these contexts concerns the recognition of the existence 
of a contract; the second involves ascertaining the terms of a properly recognized 
contract.  While it makes perfect sense to claim, as Murray does, that all contracts 
require some form of manifestation of intention to be legally bound, whether 
expressed in words or implied from conduct, it also makes sense to distinguish 
between those terms of such a manifestation that are expressed in language and
those terms that are not expressed in so many words.  The meaning of such terms 
is implied from what has been expressed or from the conduct of the parties.  
Based as they are on these facts, it is fair to call such terms “implied-in-fact.” 
That the distinct issues of the (a) existence of a contract and (b) the 
meaning of its terms get blurred is illustrated as well by Williston’s summary of 
the distinction between “express” and “implied” contracts:  “Contracts may be 
express or implied.  Just as assent may be manifested by words, so intention to 
make a promise may be manifested in language or by implication from other 
circumstances, including the parties’ course of dealing or course of performance, 
or a usage of trade.”9  From this observation, he defines “an implied-in-fact 
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6contract” as arising “from mutual agreement and intent to promise, when the 
agreement and promise have simply not been expressed in words.” 10   He then 
shifts his focus from the express or implied nature of a contract or “agreement” to 
the express or implied nature of “the terms of” a contract:  “An express contract is 
a contract the terms of which are stated by the parties; an implied contract is a 
contract the terms of which are not explicitly stated.” 11   He concludes that “[T]he 
legal effect of the two types of contracts are identical; the distinction is based on 
the way in which mutual assent is manifested.” 12   But there is a crucial 
distinction between consent to “the agreement” and consent to the particular terms 
of a “promise” that get run together in this confusing passage.
The manifestation of intent to enter a binding agreement is often implied 
rather than being expressed in so many words.  Indeed, the existence of 
bargained-for consideration is a useful indicia of an implied consent to be legally 
bound.13  However, even if Murray is right that all contracts are “express” insofar 
as they result from a discernable manifestation of “an intention to assume the 
alleged undertaking,”14 each and every term of an “express contract” may not be 
expressed in so many words.  There still needs to be a label to describe those 
terms of a contract that are not expressed in so many words.  That label is 
“implied-in-fact.”
In his book, Studies in the Ways of Words,15 philosopher of language Paul 
Grice made a similar common-sense distinction between what is “said” and what 
is “implicated” by what is said.  He begins with the following example: In 
response to a question from A about how her friend C is doing in his new job, B 
replies, “Oh quite well, I think; he likes his colleagues, and he hasn’t been to 
prison yet.”16  A might then inquire about what B was implying, suggesting, or 
even meant by her statement that C “hasn’t been to prison yet.”  Perhaps the 
answer is that C is a rather dishonest fellow in a job that would offer temptation 
for criminal behavior; or perhaps the others with whom C is working are 
disreputable and C may well fall under their influence.   
Grice notes that it “is clear that, whatever B implied, suggested, meant in 
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7this example, is distinct from what B said, which is simply that C had not been to 
prison yet.”17  He then offers, “as terms of art, the verb implicate and the related 
nouns implicature (c.f. implying) and implacatum (c.f. what is implied).”18  Grice 
uses the term “said” to refer to the “conventional meaning of the words (the 
sentence)” uttered by a speaker.19  To appreciate the difference between what is 
said and what is implied, consider Grice’s example of professor A responding to a 
request for a recommendation of one of his students for a teaching job in 
philosophy.  Suppose the professor writes, “Dear Sir, Mr. X’s command of 
English is excellent, and his attendance at tutorials has been regular.  Yours, etc.”  
Grice assesses the implicature of this statement as follows:
A cannot be opting out, since if he wished to be uncooperative, 
why write at all?  He cannot be unable, through ignorance, to say 
more, since the man is his pupil; moreover, he knows that more 
information than this is wanted.  He must, therefore, be wishing to 
impart information that he is reluctant to write down.  This 
supposition is tenable only if he thinks Mr. X is no good at 
philosophy.  This, then, is what he is implicating.20
In short, Professor A has said only that his pupil was an excellent speaker of 
English and a regular attendee at tutorial, but in the context of the conversation he 
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8has necessarily implied or implicated that his pupil is unqualified for the teaching 
position in philosophy.
That Grice’s distinction between what is said and what is implicated 
mirrors contract law’s distinction between express and implied terms is no 
coincidence.  Grice’s project is to explain, rather than undermine or transcend,
common sense.  His aim is to provide “a defense of the rights of the ordinary man 
or common sense vis-á-vis the professional philosopher . . . .”21  As he puts it, 
“the ordinary man has a right to more respect from the professional philosopher 
than a word of thanks for having gotten him started.”22  All philosophers of 
language “agree that specialist theory has to start from some basis in ordinary 
thought of an informal character.”23  Grice rejects the approach of those 
philosophers who, after starting with common practice, then proceed as though 
“the contribution of ordinary thought and speech can be ignored, like a ladder to 
be kicked away once the specialist has got going.”24
Given that it results from a constant confrontation with the practice of 
making, interpreting, and enforcing private agreements among countless persons, 
contract law doctrine is a product of, and in turn a source of, common sense with 
respect to the interpretation of writings.
C.  Constitutional Meaning: Expressed and Implied
The parallel between expressed and implied-in-fact terms of written 
contracts and the meaning of a written constitution is reasonably straightforward.  
A provision of a constitution may expressly “say” one thing while, at the same 
time, implicating some further proposition.  Let us consider some examples, 
beginning with the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment that reads, “nor shall 
private property be taken for public use without just compensation.”25  This 
provision clearly implies, though it does not expressly say, that Congress has the 
power to take private property for public use.  If such a power of eminent domain 
exists, it is not expressed anywhere else in the original Constitution.  But a 
conventional implication of what the Fifth Amendment says is that such a power 
does exist, and therefore a law that took property for public use would be 
“proper” under the Necessary and Proper Clause, provided that just compensation 
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9is made.  A bit more controversially, the Takings Clause also implies, without 
saying expressly, that Congress has no power to take for private use whether or 
not just compensation is provided.  If either or both of these propositions are truly 
constitutional implications, then they are part of the public meaning of the 
Constitution as enacted even though they were not expressed in so many words.
Next, let us consider the Ninth Amendment: “The enumeration in the 
constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others 
retained by the people.”26  This provision expressly enjoins one, and only one, 
particular constitutional construction: any claim that, because some rights have 
been enumerated, another unenumerated right may be denied or disparaged.  Or, 
to put it another way, a right that is not enumerated may not be denied or 
disparaged on the grounds that other rights were enumerated.  The historical 
evidence of original meaning strongly supports the conclusion that a “retained” 
right was a reference to natural rights.27  If this historical claim is true, then it is 
also part of what the Amendment says: the fact that some rights were enumerated 
cannot be used to justify denying or disparaging the natural rights of the people.
The original meaning of the Ninth Amendment also implies more than 
what it expressly says.  In particular, it implies (1) that there are natural rights that 
are retained by the people and (2) that these rights should not be denied or 
disparaged.  Taken together, these two implied propositions enjoin the denial or 
disparagement of natural rights, even where such a denial is not being justified on 
the grounds that other rights were enumerated.  
Of course, such a meaning might have been communicated expressly 
rather than by implication.  To see how, consider the following provision that was 
proposed by Representative Roger Sherman as a member of the House Select 
Committee tasked with drafting amendments that became what we now call the 
Bill of Rights: “The people have certain natural rights which are retained by them 
when they enter into Society. . . .  Of these rights therefore they Shall not be 
deprived by the Government of the united States.”28  Although Sherman’s 
                                                
26 U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
27 See Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What it Says, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1 
(2006).
28 Roger Sherman’s Draft of the Bill of Rights, in RANDY E. BARNETT, 1 THE RIGHTS 
RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 351 (1989). 
The omitted portion of Sherman’s proposal (indicated by the ellipses) gave a nonexclusive list of 
examples of these natural rights:
Such are the rights of Conscience in matters of religion; of acquiring property, 
and of pursuing happiness & Safety; of Speaking, writing and publishing their 
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proposal is not what the Ninth Amendment eventually said, what the Amendment 
does say implies to a normal speaker of English both the existence of natural 
rights that are retained by the people and an injunction against the deprivation of 
these rights.  In other words, Sherman’s proposal is part of the original—implied-
in-fact—meaning of the Ninth Amendment.
Remember also that for two years, the Constitution existed without either 
the Fifth or Ninth Amendments.  During this period, a claim that the federal 
government lacked any power of eminent domain was consistent with the 
meaning of the unamended text of the Constitution.  So too was the claim that 
there were no such things as natural retained rights that the government was 
obligated to respect.  Equally consistent with the text, however, were the contrary 
propositions that there existed both a power of eminent domain and individual 
natural rights.  Deciding which of these alternative propositions to adopt would 
have been a matter of constitutional construction, rather than interpretation.  
While most everyone probably assumed that takings for public use must be 
compensated and that unenumerated natural rights could not properly be infringed 
by the federal government, neither proposition was communicated by the 
unamended text of the Constitution.
The enactment of the Fifth and Ninth Amendments changed this situation.  
Both of these qualifications of federal power altered the meaning of the text in 
ways that went beyond what they said.  The wording of the now express 
requirement of just compensation also implied the existence of a power of 
eminent domain for public use, but not for private use.  The express bar on any 
construction of the Constitution that violated an unenumerated right simply 
because the right was not included in the enumeration also implied the existence 
of natural rights and an injunction against their deprivation by the federal 
government.
That express limitations on powers might have further—and potentially 
dangerous—implications was well known to the Founders.  Indeed, during the 
ratification process, Federalists attempted to justify the lack of a bill of rights in 
the original Constitution on the grounds that the enumeration of certain rights 
could imply the existence of additional federal powers beyond those that were 
enumerated.  For example, at the Pennsylvania ratification convention, James 
                                                                                                                                    
Sentiments with decency and freedom; of peaceably assembling to consult their 
common good, and of applying to Government by petition or remonstrance for 
redress of grievances.
Id.
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Wilson observed: “If we attempt an enumeration, everything that is not 
enumerated is presumed to be given.  The consequence is, that an imperfect 
enumeration would throw all implied power into the scale of the government; and 
the rights of the people would be rendered incomplete.”29  The same argument 
was made by Charles Pinckney in the South Carolina House of Representatives
who justified the absence of a bill of rights on the ground that “as we might 
perhaps have omitted the enumeration of some of our rights, it might hereafter be 
said we had delegated to the general government a power to take away such of 
our rights as we had not enumerated.30  
In The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton famously expressed his fear of 
constitutional implicature.  “Why, for instance,” asked Hamilton, “should it be 
said that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by 
which restrictions may be imposed?”31  Although Hamilton denied that “such a 
provision would confer a regulating power,” he nevertheless thought that “it is 
evident that it would furnish, to men disposed to usurp, a plausible pretense for 
claiming that power.”32  The problem arose from the phenomenon of 
constitutional implicature:  “that the provision against restraining the liberty of the 
press afforded a clear implication, that a power to prescribe proper regulations 
concerning it was intended to be vested in the national government.”33  
Although an express protection of freedom of the press would not expressly grant 
Congress any additional authority, such authority or “constructive powers”34  
could, rightly or wrongly, potentially be implied.
As is now well known among scholars of the Ninth Amendment, James 
Madison devised the Amendment precisely to negate this implication.  Here is the 
entirety of his explanation to Congress of the rationale for his proposed precursor 
of the Ninth Amendment:
It has been objected also against a Bill of Rights, that, by 
enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would 
                                                
29 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 388 (Merrill 
Jensen, ed., 1976) (statement of James Wilson to the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, Nov. 28, 
1787).
30 4 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 316 (Jonathan Elliot, ed. 
1859) (Statement of Charles Pinckney, Friday, Jan. 18, 1788).
31 THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 524 (Alexander Hamilton) (Wills, ed. 1982).
32 Id..
33 Id. (emphasis added).
34 Id. at 525.
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disparage those rights which were not placed in that enumeration; 
and it might follow by implication, that those rights which were not 
singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the 
General Government, and were consequently insecure.  This is one 
of the most plausible arguments I have ever heard against the 
admission of a bill of rights into this system; but, I conceive, that it 
may be guarded against.  I have attempted it, as gentlemen may see 
by turning to the last clause of the fourth resolution.35
The analysis presented here adds to the debate over the meaning of the Nonth 
Amendment by explaining why its rule of construction not only negates a 
misconstruction of enumerated rights, which is what is says expressly; it also 
implicates both the existence of natural “rights . . . retained by the people” 36  and 
an injunction that these rights “shall not be . . . disparage[d]” 37  or denied
altogether. 
 Whether or not a constitutional implication exists in the next example is 
controversial.  The Second Amendment reads, “A well regulated militia, being 
necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear 
arms, shall not be infringed.”38  This provision expressly affirms two distinct 
propositions.  The first is that a well regulated militia is necessary to the security 
of a free state; the second is that the right of the people to keep and bear arms 
shall not be infringed.  The distinction between constitutional expression and 
constitutional implicature helps clarify the conflicting claims made about the 
meaning of the Second Amendment.  
Some contend that the combination of these two propositions in a single 
passage adds an additional implication to what these two provisions say: either (a) 
the implication that the right affirmed in the second half is somehow conditioned 
on the continued existence of the militia, whose importance is affirmed in the first 
proposition; or (b) the implication that the exercise of the right affirmed in the 
second proposition can take place only in the context of the well-regulated militia 
                                                
35 James Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments (June 8, 1789), 
in JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS 443 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999) (emphasis added) (referring to a 
precursor of the Ninth Amendment).  Notice that, while Madison here refers only to the 
“disparagement” of the “rights which were not placed in the enumeration,” the enacted version of 
the Ninth Amendment also enjoins their denial.
36 U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
37 Id.
38 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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to which the first proposition refers.  Because the amendment says neither 
proposition expressly, in the realm of constitutional interpretation, the real debate 
is over whether either (a) or (b) is implied by what was said. Whichever 
proposition is implicated is part of the Amendment’s original meaning.  
On the other hand, if neither proposition is implicated by what the text 
says, they could still be unexpressed assumptions that were held by some or all of 
the people when the Bill of Rights was adopted.  Suppose this can be shown.  Of 
what relevance would the existence of such unexpressed assumptions be to 
constitutional theory or practice?
II.  CONSTITUTIONAL ASSUMPTIONS
To this point, I have claimed that the meaning of the Constitution—that is, 
the content of the message that is conveyed by its text—includes both the 
meaning that is expressed and the meaning that is implicated by what it says.  To 
interpret the Constitution is to identify its meaning, whether expressed or implied.  
The original meaning of the Constitution and its amendments is the expressed and 
implied meaning of its text when enacted; an originalist method of interpretation 
limits interpretation to this meaning, rather than a meaning of the text that arises 
at some later time.  
Those who wrote and adopted the Constitution, along with everyone else 
who lived at the time, also held additional assumptions that might have influenced 
how they expected the government established by the Constitution to operate.  
Some may also have held certain assumptions or expectations about how it would 
be interpreted or applied in future cases. The question we must now address is 
what, if anything, is the proper role of these assumptions in constitutional theory 
and practice?  As we did with meaning, let us start with what contract law has to 
teach us about basic assumptions.  In this case, however, the important difference 
between contracts and constitutions will come to the fore and justify a differential 
treatment of background assumptions.  Indeed, some of the controversy and 
confusion surrounding constitutional interpretation comes from improperly 
conflating contracts with constitutions.
A.  Basic Assumptions of a Contract
The distinction between express and implied-in-fact terms is one 
contribution of contract law that, as we have seen, is relevant to understanding the 
enterprise of constitutional interpretation.  Another is its treatment of the 
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background or basic assumptions underlying a contract.  These assumptions are 
not themselves expressed in the agreement.  Indeed, most are too basic to merit 
inclusion in the agreement.  When the salesman tells you to take your car around 
the back of the store to pick up your goods, he does not need to expressly affirm 
or even imply that the road outside the store that connects the parking lot to the 
loading dock that existed when he arrived at work is still there.  If the express and 
implied terms to which the parties consented is the exposed portion of the iceberg, 
the assumptions on which their consent was based constitutes the ice that floats 
beneath the surface.
Lon Fuller called these “tacit assumptions.”  How he described them is 
worth quoting at length:
Words like “intention” “assumption,” “expectation” and 
“understanding” all seem to imply a conscious state involving an 
awareness of alternatives and a deliberate choice among them.  It 
is, however, plain that there is a psychological state which can be 
described as a “tacit assumption” that does not involve a 
consciousness of alternatives.  The absent-minded professor 
stepping from his office into the hall as he reads a book “assumes” 
that the floor of the hall will be there to receive him.  His conduct 
is conditioned and directed by this assumption, even though the 
possibility that the floor has been removed does not “occur” to 
him, that is, is not present in his mental processes.39
Although not a part of one’s consciousness, these background tacit assumptions 
are quite real.  If you are reading these words away from your residence, you are 
tacitly assuming that your home or apartment has not been destroyed since you 
were last there.  You certainly were not consciously thinking about it but, now 
that you are, it is no fiction to say, “Yes, that was indeed what you were 
assuming.”
Most of the time, our tacit assumptions turn out to be true or, at least, it 
does not matter if they are mistaken.  But sometimes when our consent to enter 
into a contract is premised on such an assumption and it “fails,” this could be 
grounds for relieving one party from what appears to have been an unqualified 
commitment.  Contract law has a number of defenses to enforcement that are 
based on this intuition, such as mistake of present existing fact, frustration of 
                                                
39 LON L. FULLER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 666–67 (1947).
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purpose, and impracticability.  
With mistake, a fact that was tacitly assumed by both parties to be true at 
the time of formation, and that was material to the assent of the party seeking to 
avoid the enforcement of the agreement, turns out to be false.  With frustration, 
the value of receiving performance has unexpectedly been greatly reduced to the 
person seeking to avoid the contract, due to developments that neither party 
anticipated.  With impracticability, an unexpected change in circumstances led to 
a great increase in one party’s cost of performance.40  In each of these 
circumstances, when one party seeks to enforce the agreement, the other party is 
saying, in effect, “Well, I did not agree to that.” 
“Common sense,” writes Andrew Kull, “sets limits to a promise, even 
where contractual language does not.” 41  Such limits are not to be found in either 
the expressed or implied meaning of the terms.  “Though a promise is expressed 
in unqualified terms, a person does not normally mean to bind himself to do the 
impossible, or to persevere when performance proves to be materially different 
from what both parties anticipated at the time of formation.”42  
These qualifications are not implied by what was said, but rest on the 
background assumptions of the parties.  “Faced with the adverse consequences of 
such a disparity, even a person who has previously regarded his promise as 
unconditional is likely to protest that he never promised to do that.” 43  As Kull 
explains, “[t]he force of the implicit claim is hard to deny: I did not mean my 
promise to extend to this circumstance; nor did you so understand it; to give it that 
effect would therefore be to enforce a contract different from the one we actually 
made.”44
Such limitations on the enforceability of an unqualified promise exist 
despite the absence of any expressed or implied-in-fact condition on the 
obligation to perform.  Fuller offers the example of a person “who contracts to 
deliver goods a year from now at a price now fixed” 45  Such a person “certainly 
‘takes into account’ the possibility of some fluctuation in price levels, but may 
feel that a ten-fold inflation was contrary to an ‘assumption’ or ‘expectation’ that 
                                                
40See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 599-647 (4th ed. 2004) (explaining doctrines of 
mistake, impracticability and frustration of purposes).
41 Andrew Kull, Mistake, Frustration, and the Windfall Principle of Contract Remedies, 43 
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 38–39 (1991) (emphasis added).
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 FULLER, supra note 39.
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price variations would occur within the ‘normal’ range, and that this expectation 
was ‘the foundation of the agreement.’”46  
Defenses to enforcing contracts based on a failure of basic assumptions 
have another pertinent component: these assumptions must be shared by both 
parties.  “The assumption may be tacit . . . .  But the assumption must have been 
shared by both parties; no account is taken of one party’s purely private 
assumption.”47  In other words, the contract cannot be said to have been based on 
a basic assumption unless it was the sort of assumption shared by both parties.  If 
it was not held in common, then we say that a party who is unilaterally mistaken 
has born the risk of her mistake and the contract can be enforced against her.  
Another way to understand the requirement of mutuality is that only an 
assumption shared by both parties is deemed to be so basic as to go without 
saying.  Any assumption held by just one of the parties is simply not fundamental 
enough to justify concluding that the contract has failed.
To sum up, in contract law, a failure of an assumption that is so 
fundamental that it was shared by both parties provides a reason to deny the 
enforcement of a written contract that expresses no such condition on 
performance.  In other words, while these assumptions do not change the literal 
meaning of what was expressed or implied, they do provide a normative reason to 
release a party from her commitment notwithstanding the unqualified meaning of 
her manifested consent.  Why background assumptions are relevant to contractual 
obligation immediately calls into question any comparable role for background 
assumptions in constitutional theory and practice.
B.  The Basic Assumptions of the Constitution
We might begin by asking why the failure of a basic assumption can result 
in the non-enforcement of a contract.  The reason suggested above is that, if the 
justice of enforcing contracts is based on the consent of the parties, then the truth 
of a basic assumption is an unstated condition of that consent.  This is what was 
meant by saying that, while a party may have agreed to perform without express 
condition, nevertheless she did not agree to that—that is, to perform ‘come hell or 
high water.’  But while the existence and failure of a background assumption 
conditions or qualifies a contractual obligation, it does not change the literal 
meaning of what was expressed or implied in the contract.
                                                
46 Id.
47 FARNSWORTH, supra note 44, at 629.
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Here is where the potential difference between contracts and constitutions 
comes to the fore.  If one thinks that constitutions are based on consent, then it 
would be natural to see them premised on the tacit assumptions of those whose 
consent makes a constitution binding.  If a constitution is not based on consent,
however, the imperative to condition its application on the tacit assumptions of 
some person or group becomes much less compelling.  In the absence of consent, 
it still makes sense to say the members of a polity can today be bound by the 
original public meaning of a written constitution that was adopted by others at 
some time in the past.  Without a consensual basis of constitutional legitimacy, 
however, it makes far less sense to say that members of a polity are bound by the 
tacit assumptions of some particular group.  
Moreover, the result of a failure of basic assumption in contract is the 
failure of the contract itself.  This too results from the consensual basis of a 
contract.  Where consent runs out, so too does the “private law” to which the 
parties consented.  The contract is then at an end.  But with constitutions, failure 
is not an option.  Or perhaps, while constitutional failure can occur, failure does 
not result simply because the assumptions held by some persons at the time of a 
constitution’s enactment have turned out not to be true.  Constitutions are built to 
last for a very long time, and the longer they are in effect the more vulnerable 
become the assumptions that were held at the time they were enacted.
In his book, Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional Evil, Mark 
Graber discusses an assumption made by numerous slave-holding founders and 
others that the population would expand in the temperate South at a greater rate 
than in the colder North.48  As a result, they assumed that the express textual 
protection of slavery would be unnecessary because it would be protected 
effectively enough by the various electoral mechanisms incorporated into the 
Constitution.49  The politics of slavery markedly changed, however, when 
population unexpectedly expanded disproportionately in the North, thereby 
increasing its representation in the House as well as in the Electoral College.50
When this occurred, the balance of slave and free states in the equally 
apportioned Senate unexpectedly became the sole remaining political protection 
of slavery.  Ironically, the Virginia Plan for the Constitution had called for 
proportional representation in both the House and Senate, and the Convention was 
                                                
48 See MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 102
(2006) (“[C]onstitutional framers from all regions of the country assumed that population 
increases would be greatest in the South and Southwest.”).
49 See id. at 101-06.
50 See id. at 126-28.
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thrown into turmoil when the smaller states obtained equal representation in the 
Senate.51  Later, some Virginians could be quite happy their plan was modified in 
this respect.
If this historical claim about expected population growth is accurate, it 
would seem to have been a pretty basic assumption.  But should it matter?  Is the 
meaning of the Constitution affected by this alleged failure of a basic assumption, 
such that the national government no longer functioned “as originally 
intended”?52  The answer to this question requires distinguishing both between the 
activities of constitutional interpretation and constitutional construction, and 
between the problems of ambiguity and vagueness of constitutional language.
C.  Interpretation vs. Construction—Ambiguity vs. Vagueness
The existence of a writing gives rise to two distinct activities: (1) 
ascertaining the meaning of the words that are conveyed by the text considered in 
context; and (2) applying the meaning of these words, properly ascertained, to the 
facts and circumstances of particular cases.  Following Keith Whittington,53 I use 
                                                
51See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY 275 (2004) (describing the shift by Virginia and other Southern states to enumerate the 
powers of Congress immediately after the Convention approved equal representation in the 
Senate). 
52 GRABER, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 106.
When the national government was functioning as originally intended, national 
policy would be approved by a Southern-tilting House of Representatives, and a 
Northern-tilting Senate.  In firm control of the presidency, the federal judiciary, 
and the House of Representatives, a united South would veto any legislation too 
hostile to Southern interests.
Id.
53See KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING,
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (1999):
Although the clauses and structures that make up the text cannot be simply 
empty of meaning, for they are clearly recognizable as language, the meaning 
that they do convey may be so broad and underdetermined as to be incapable of 
faithful reduction to legal rules. . . .  Regardless of the extent of judicial 
interpretation of certain aspects of the Constitution, there will remain an 
impenetrable sphere of meaning that cannot be simply discovered.  The judiciary 
may be able to delimit textual meaning, hedging in the possibilities, but after all 
judgments have been rendered specifying discoverable meaning, major 
indeterminacies may remain.  The specification of a single governing meaning 
from these possibilities requires an act of creativity beyond interpretation. . . .  
This additional step is the construction of meaning.
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the term “interpretation” to refer to the ascertainment of the meaning of the 
language, and “construction” to refer to the application of this meaning, properly 
interpreted, to particular circumstances.  But whatever labels one adopts, these are 
two distinct activities.
I do not mean to suggest that, in practice, it is always clear whether a 
particular issue is one of meaning/interpretation or application/construction.  But 
it is still useful to separate these as different activities if for no other reason is that 
it puts originalism in its proper place.  If original meaning originalism is 
considered a method of interpretation, then applying the original public meaning 
of the text to particular cases will often still require other constructive methods to 
supplement the meaning of the text.  Such methods are, by assumption, 
“noninterpretivist” but would nevertheless be consistent with originalist 
interpretation provided the constructions being used do not violate or contradict 
what the text says or implicates.  The interpretation-construction distinction also 
reveals that those who advocate filling the gaps in original public meaning by 
appealing to the original intentions of the Framers are proposing a noninterpretive 
exercise in construction, since the semantic meaning of text itself does not present 
this narrower meaning even when context is taken into account.
The language of a text may not communicate a unique solution to 
particular cases and controversies because that text may be either ambiguous or
vague.  Contracts scholar Allan Farnsworth offered the following useful 
distinction between these two problems of ascertaining linguistic meaning:
Ambiguity, properly defined, is an entirely distinct concept from 
that of vagueness.  A word that may or may not be applicable to 
marginal objects is vague.  But a word may also have two entirely 
different connotations so that it may be applied to an object and be 
at the same time both clearly appropriate and inappropriate, as the 
word “light” may be when applied to dark feathers.  Such a word is 
ambiguous.54
In other words, language is ambiguous when it has more than one sense; it is 
vague when its meaning admits of borderline cases that cannot definitively be 
                                                                                                                                    
I would reserve the word “meaning” to that which is the product of interpretation, rightly 
understood, whereas Whittington would extend it to embrace the product of construction as well.  
But this is merely a terminological or semantic difference rather than a substantive one.
54E. Allan Farnsworth, Meaning in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 953 (1967).
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ruled in or out of its meaning.
The distinction between ambiguity and vagueness generally, but not 
entirely, parallels the distinction between interpretation and construction.  We are 
engaged in interpretation when resolving the ambiguity of particular terms in the 
Constitution by examining the context to determine which of several connotations 
would be attributed to a particular usage. When interpreting potential ambiguity, 
we must make a choice among alternative connotations of a term to identify the 
message that the text communicated to the public in context.  In contrast, we must 
go beyond interpretation when the meaning of a vague term does not itself convey 
enough information to include or exclude a particular object.  Deciding whether 
or not to include that object within its scope is an act of construction, not 
interpretation.  
Put another way, resolving potential ambiguity of a written text involves 
interpretation because it is the meaning of the term itself that is being ascertained.  
In contrast, questions about the vagueness of a particular term in the text are 
resolved by combining the meaning of the text with considerations extrinsic to 
this meaning.  Precisely because that meaning of the text is vague or incomplete, 
the application of its meaning to particular objects cannot be answered 
definitively by interpretation, and must be addressed by methods of construction.
However, if there is no unique sense of an ambiguous term to be 
discovered, the problem of ambiguity may also need to be handled by 
construction rather than interpretation.  Such irresolvable ambiguity could arise in 
at least three situations.  In these three situations, a term is irresolvably ambiguous 
because there is no historical truth of the matter concerning which alternative 
meaning was the unique public meaning of the text in context.  In such a situation, 
the meaning of the text has run out and we must move to the activity of 
constitutional construction.
First is what Lawrence Solum calls “epistemic ambiguity” that arises 
when a provision of the Constitution was originally unambiguous but the 
information necessary to resolve the semantic content is no longer available.55  
Second, the Drafters may have deliberately chosen ambiguous language to paper 
over irreconcilable differences among them.  Solum calls this “compromise 
ambiguity.”56  It is alleged, for example, that the language of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause was left deliberately ambiguous to allow both sides of the debate 
                                                
55See Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism, Illinois Public Law Research Paper No. 07-
24, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244.
56Id.
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over the scope of federal power to argue later that theirs was the meaning enacted 
in the Constitution.57
Finally, it is also possible for the Framers to deliberately employ 
ambiguous language to accomplish a nefarious purpose, or at least an unpopular 
one.  Solum calls this “deceptive ambiguity.”58  Indeed, the Framers could 
actually employ ordinarily unambiguous language and, if their intentions were 
widely enough known, this language would become ambiguous in context.  As we 
shall see in the next Part, this is what resulted from the Framers’ use of 
euphemistic language or perfectly “innocent” language to refer obliquely to 
slavery, an unambiguous term they refused to employ.  “Euphemism” has been 
defined as a “figure of speech which consists in the substitution of a word or 
expression of comparatively favourable implication or less unpleasant 
associations, instead of the harsher or more offensive one that would more 
precisely designate what is intended.”59  If the favorable expression being 
substituted has no previous semantic connection to the offensive words, then the 
very usage of the euphemism, if widely understood as such, renders these 
favorable expressions potentially ambiguous.
The difference between interpretation and construction and between 
ambiguity and vagueness is crucial to identifying the proper role of constitutional 
assumptions.  First, some background assumptions can be relevant to the
interpretive act of ascertaining the original meaning of the text, in particular to 
resolving ambiguity where this is possible.  Indeed, the existence of commonly-
held background assumptions is why we often do not even realize that the words 
of the Constitution sometimes have more than one possible meaning.  Second, 
whether and which background assumptions are relevant to addressing problems 
of vagueness, as well as any residual problems of ambiguity that do not yield to 
interpretation, will depend upon one’s theory of constitutional construction.
To see how background assumptions resolve potential ambiguity, consider 
the word “arms” in the Second Amendment.  “Arms” is ambiguous insofar as it 
can refer to weapons, to the limbs to which our hands are attached, or to a 
component of a chair or sofa.  Each of these distinct meanings is mutually 
                                                
57See JOSEPH M. LYNCH NEGOTIATING THE CONSTITUTION: THE EARLIEST DEBATES OVER 
ORIGINAL INTENT 25 (1999) (“The ambiguity of the language that the committee proposed and 
that the convention approved enabled both sides not only to approve its inclusion in the 
Constitution but also to argue afterwards that their construction was in accord with the framers’ 
intent.”).
58See Solum, supra note 55.
59OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)
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incompatible with the others; whatever “arms” means in the Second Amendment, 
it means only one of these.  Accurately interpreting the Second Amendment 
requires a choice among these competing and incompatible meanings of the word 
“arms.”  Unlike vagueness, ambiguity can usually be addressed by historical 
evidence because the alternatives are few and the choices are mutually exclusive.  
“Arms” either meant weapons or limbs or a furniture part; there is no in between 
or grey area between these three meanings.  And historical evidence usually 
establishes with reasonable certainty which of the relatively finite number of 
discrete meanings was the one conveyed by the language that was used. 
Certainly a member of the public would conclude from the context that the 
word “arms” meant weapons—or some subset of weapons—and not limbs or a 
furniture component.  In part, this conclusion would be based on the full language 
of the Second Amendment and the Constitution as a whole.  But if the ambiguity 
is not clearly resolved by the document itself, we might move beyond its four 
corners to consider its publicly-known purposes.  Such purposes could be 
characterized as background assumptions.  
This example illustrates how, when a term is ambiguous, its public 
meaning could be influenced by basic assumptions—especially the publicly 
known purposes of a provision.  This example also shows how the problem of 
ambiguity is a historical question that can usually be resolved by examining 
historical evidence to identify the context that determined the “intended” 
meaning.  The same cannot be said about vagueness.  A vague term is not 
rendered any less vague when we examine how some expected it to be applied to 
particular cases.  With ambiguity, the background assumptions of the public can 
assist us in ascertaining which of a term’s several senses constituted its original 
meaning.  A vague term remains vague even after we examine how some 
expected it to be applied. 
Before appealing to background assumptions, however, we must be 
careful to take into account the entire context that is conveyed by the text itself.  
For example, it used to be popular for some law professors and historians to claim 
that the Second Amendment protected the “collective right” of states to preserve 
their militias rather than the rights of individuals to their own privately held 
weapons.60  In other words, they claimed that the word “the people” in the Second 
Amendment was ambiguous as between individuals and states, but that the 
historical evidence of the background assumptions of the public resolved the 
                                                
60 See, e.g. IRVING BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ITS ORIGIN AND MEANING 486-87 
(1965)
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ambiguity in favor of a “collective right” of states.  Before consulting background 
assumptions, however, a faithful interpreter would need to consider the context 
provided by the surrounding text.  In particular, the individual nature of all the 
other rights identified in the Bill of Rights that were described as belonging to 
“the people,” such as Fourth Amendment’s reference to “[t]he right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, papers, houses and effects,”61 as well as the express 
distinction between “the people” and “the states” in the Tenth Amendment.62  
As in modern contract law, it is entirely fair to look to shared background 
assumptions beyond the four corners of the text to establish the existence of, as 
well as to reconcile, potential ambiguity.63  Before appealing to extratextual or 
extrinsic evidence of meaning, however, other pertinent intratextual or intrinsic
evidence of meaning that reduces the scope of any potential ambiguity must first 
be examined.  Instead of inquiring whether “the people” in the Second 
Amendment, considered in isolation, had multiple possible meanings, one would 
inquire whether historical evidence shows the phrase “the people” conveyed a 
different meaning in the Second Amendment than it did elsewhere in the 
immediately surrounding text—a much more particular and difficult burden to 
sustain.
Unlike ambiguity, vagueness cannot be resolved by historical evidence.  
Examples of vague terms in the Constitution are easy to find.  What are “cruel and 
unusual punishments?”  What are “unreasonable searches and seizures?”  The 
term “unreasonable” communicates no bright lines to distinguish whether a 
particular mode of searching is permissible or impermissible.  Deciding whether a 
particular punishment is “cruel and unusual” or a particular search is 
“unreasonable” requires more than the original public meaning of the term.  To 
the extent that these terms are vague they inevitably require constitutional 
construction based on noninterpretive considerations when being applied to a 
particular practice.  
On the other hand, the original meaning of some allegedly vague terms 
may convey considerably more information than is commonly thought.  For 
example, textual and historical context shows that the original meaning of the 
“rights . . . retained by the people” referred to natural rights, which were 
                                                
61U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”).
62See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.”).
63See Farnsworth, supra note 541.
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conceived as “liberty rights.”64  And the “privileges or immunities of citizens”65
was a reference to natural rights or “immunities,” in addition to other particular 
positive rights or “privileges” contained in the Bill of Rights.66  Even the “equal 
protection of the laws” in the Fourteenth Amendment may not be nearly as vague 
as is commonly asserted, given that “equal” is connected to the “protection of the 
laws”67—a largely executive branch function—and “of the laws” seems to refer 
back to laws that do not violate the Privileges or Immunities Clause in the very 
same sentence.68  Given this intratextual context, even the “due process of the 
law”69 may be significantly less vague or open-textured than is commonly 
thought.  This phrase might well refer to procedures that ensure the accuracy of 
imposing the three possible legal sanctions for breach of a criminal or civil duty 
imposed by the law: capital punishment (“life”), imprisonment (“liberty”), and 
fine or judgment (“property”).  Although the phrase “due process” is vague as to 
which exact procedures provide the requisite accuracy, the range of vagueness is 
narrowed considerably by the context.
Because whatever vagueness may remain in the original meaning of the 
text after considering its context cannot, by assumption, be clarified by original 
meaning, some additional theory of construction is required.  Perhaps one’s 
theory of constitutional construction would authorize a reliance on the original 
background assumptions held by all or some persons at the time the text was 
                                                
64See BARNETT, supra note 58, at 53–60.
65U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
66See BARNETT, supra note 58, at 60–68; see also WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON 
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *125 (W.S. Hein & Co. reprint 1992) (1768):
Thus much for the declaration of our rights and liberties. The rights themselves 
thus defined by [Magna Carta and other foundational] statutes, consist in a 
number of private immunities; which will appear, from what has been premised, 
to be indeed no other, than either that residuum of natural liberty, which is not 
required by the laws of society to be sacrificed to public convenience; or else 
those civil privileges, which society hath engaged to provide, in lieu of the 
natural liberties so given up by individuals. . . . And these may be reduced to 
three principal or primary articles; the right of personal security, the right of 
personal liberty; and the right of private property . . . .
67 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”).
68See id. (“No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States.”) (emphasis added).
69See id. (“nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.”).
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enacted.  For example, one could advocate addressing vagueness by appealing to 
the original intentions of the Framers of the text, or to how they expected a 
particularly vague provision would be applied to particular cases.  
Both original intent and original expected application could be considered 
background constitutional assumptions.  Reliance on these assumptions would 
require additional normative justification beyond whatever normative justification 
there is for respecting the original semantic meaning of the text itself.  In other 
words, one’s theory of constitutional construction when addressing the problem of 
vagueness requires justification apart from one’s theory of interpretation.  As will 
be discussed in the next Part, one’s theory of construction inescapably depends on 
one’s theory of constitutional legitimacy.
We are now in a better position to evaluate the relevance of the 
widespread mistaken assumption, discussed by Mark Graber, that population 
would grow faster in the South than in the North to the interpretation of the 
Constitution.  With respect to interpretation, this assumption seems clearly 
irrelevant.  There is not a single word in the Constitution that expressly mentions 
this assumption; nor can it be implied-in-fact from what the Constitution says; nor 
is it helpful to resolve any ambiguity in what the Constitution says.  Graber’s 
example is an excellent illustration of how some background assumptions, 
however “fundamental” they may have been, are entirely irrelevant to the 
meaning of the text.  
Moreover, even if background assumptions do play a role in constitutional 
construction, this particular assumption does not seem to bear on any vagueness 
in the text.  So the claim must be either that the Constitution “fails” because the 
assumption on which it is based has turned out unexpectedly, or that the 
Constitution should be construed in a manner as to somehow take into account
this change in basic assumptions, notwithstanding its irrelevance to any issue of 
ambiguity or vagueness.  How one evaluates either of these claims will depend 
mainly on one’s theory of constitutional legitimacy.
III.  THE INESCAPABILITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY
In the previous Part, I contended that constitutional interpretation is the 
activity of ascertaining the meaning of the words in the text of the Constitution, 
and that background assumptions may sometimes be relevant to resolving 
ambiguity.  All originalist theories of interpretation maintain that judges and other 
government officials should obey the meaning of the text at the time it was 
enacted—though they may differ on how this original meaning is to be 
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ascertained.  While ascertaining the original meaning of the text is a descriptive 
endeavor, whether or not government officials should be held to the meaning of 
the text of the Constitution at the time it was enacted is a normative question I 
address elsewhere.70  The normative thesis I present there is that a written 
constitution is the means by which law is imposed on those who would impose 
law on the general public, and that such an objective would be undermined if 
those individuals and institutions who are supposed to be governed by this “public 
law” can alter its meaning at their own discretion.
In contrast with interpretation, constitutional construction is the 
application of the meaning of the text to particular facts and circumstances when 
the meaning revealed by interpretation is vague or irresolvably ambiguous. 
Whether and how background assumptions may be relevant to constitutional 
construction is a question that is distinct from the proper role of background 
assumptions when interpreting the meaning of the text.  The answer to this 
question will depend on one’s theory of constitutional legitimacy.  By 
constitutional legitimacy I mean why a constitution is or could be binding.  A 
law-making system is legitimate if creates commands that citizens have a duty to 
obey.  A constitution is legitimate if it creates this type of legal system.  What 
then is it about a constitution that makes it legitimate in this sense?  Why do 
citizens have a duty to obey the commands of those who are designated by a 
constitution as lawmakers and enforcers?
If pressed for an answer to this question, some would rely on “the consent 
of the governed” or what is sometimes called “popular sovereignty.”71  
Characteristic is the following statement: “The people’s representatives have a 
right to govern, so long as they do not transgress limits on their authority that are 
fairly traceable to the constitutional precommitments of the people themselves . . . 
.”72  The claim is that lawful commands of the people’s representatives bind the 
individual because the people committed themselves to be bound by their 
representatives’ commands.  In sum, individuals are bound to obey laws enacted 
by a legislature whose authority can be traced to the consent of those who are 
                                                
70 See Barnett, supra note 58, at 89–117.
71 Elsewhere I examine a more individualistic conception of popular sovereignty based, not on 
the collective consent of the people, but on the individual rights they possess in common.  See 
Randy E. Barnett, The People or the State? Chisholm v. Georgia and Popular Sovereignty, 93 VA.
L. REV. 1179 (2007); Randy E. Barnett, Kurt Lash’s Majoritarian Difficulty, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
937, 954–60 (2008).
72Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on 
Ronald Dworkin’s ‘Moral Reading’ of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1291 (1997).
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subject to the laws.  In short, those who advocate a consent theory of 
constitutional legitimacy view constitutions as very similar, if not identical to, 
contracts.
In this Part, I explain why consent theories of constitutional legitimacy 
invite the use of constitutional assumptions when engaged in constitutional 
construction.  The impracticality of doing so greatly exacerbates the problems 
with basing constitutional legitimacy on the consent of the governed.  Conversely, 
a justice-based theory of constitutional legitimacy ameliorates the difficulties of 
relying upon background assumptions by keeping them in their proper place.
A.  More Problems for the Consent Theory of Constitutional Legitimacy
I begin my book, Restoring the Lost Constitution, with a repudiation of 
consent theories of legitimacy.73  I argue that, for consent to legitimate 
governance, it must be actual or real, not hypothetical or metaphorical.74  That is 
simply how consent works as a moral principle.  One is justified in treating 
persons in certain ways when they have consented that are impermissible in the 
absence of their consent.  But, for this permission to exist, the person who is 
affected must have actually manifested or communicated their consent.  Although 
an individual can consent to have sexual relations with another person, imagine a 
group of three persons in which two vote that the third may be subjected to a 
sexual assault.  No one would suggest that the two can “consent” for the third.
It is incumbent on those who adhere to some version of a consent theory 
of constitutional legitimacy to explain just how and when an actual consent of the 
governed initially did and still does occur.  Assuming the Constitution was 
supported by a majority of the people on whom it was imposed at the time it was 
enacted, how did the dissenting minority become bound to it?  How did future 
generations?  Elsewhere, I have examined in considerable detail the difficulty 
with every story ever told about popular consent to governance, and I shall not 
repeat this critique here.75  
As with contracts, the identification of the basic assumptions on which 
consent to a constitution rests would seem to be requisite to a consent theory of 
constitutionalism.  Yet this exponentially increases the difficulties of ascertaining 
the existence and substance of consent.  When the problematic status of 
                                                
73See BARNETT, supra note , at 11–52.
74Id. at 32–52.
75See id. at 11–31.
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constitutional assumptions in constitutional construction is added to the problem 
of ascertaining genuine consent to governance, the theoretical and practical 
challenge for a consent theory of constitutional legitimacy is well nigh 
insurmountable.
If, as with contracts, one views the legitimacy of the Constitution as 
resting on the consent of the governed, then one is inevitably drawn to the 
conclusion either (a) that the Constitution “fails” when one of its basic 
assumptions does not turn out as expected, as would a contract; or (b) that the 
Constitution should be construed so as to preserve the intentions of those who 
consented to the Constitution notwithstanding the change in circumstances, as 
some would favor handling so-called “relational” contracts.  Either option is 
highly problematic.  
Finding constitutional failure undermines the ongoing nature of 
constitutionalism.  What would happen if such a failure occurs?  Could states 
secede?  Could individuals or groups?  How would failure be assessed, and by 
whom?  No obvious answers suggest themselves.  More likely, those who hold a 
consent theory of constitutional legitimacy would approach the Constitution as 
some would handle so-called “relational” or long-term contracts.76  These 
relational theorists favor construing the contract so as to preserve the ongoing 
relations of the parties.77  While relational theory has shed much light on contract 
law, judicially preserving long term contractual relations after marked changes in 
circumstances is highly controversial among contracts scholars78 and is largely 
shunned by the courts.79  However difficult this approach may be in contract, 
these difficulties are exponentially magnified with constitutions.
With a contract, one can at least identify the relevant consenting parties, 
                                                
76Referring to long-term contracts as “relational” reflects early usage by Ian Macneil.  
Although many, perhaps most, contracts scholars still use the term this way, Macneil himself 
eventually changed his terminology.  In his later writings, he contended that, whereas all (or nearly 
all) contracts were “relational,” some relational contracts were “discrete” and others “intertwined.”  
Long-term relational contracts fall into the latter category.  See Randy E. Barnett, Conflicting 
Visions: A Critique of Ian Macneil’s Relational Theory of Contract, 78 VA. L. REV. 1175, 1178 
n.16 (1992). 
77See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract Theory in Context, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 737 
(2000).
78See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search 
for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996) (discussing relation-preserving vs. 
end-game norms). 
79See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Why There is No Law of Relational Contracts, 94 NW. L. REV.
805 (2000).  
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and there likely will be very few.  Because of this, it appears to be feasible to 
identify the basic assumptions of these parties as well as their intentions, so as to 
preserve them rather than let the contract fail.  Who are the relevant “parties” to 
the Constitution, and how are their assumptions to be identified?  What sort of 
constructions count as preserving the intentions of these “parties,” given that 
future events were not as anticipated?  
To reconsider an earlier example, how should the Constitution have been 
construed to compensate for the failure of the South’s assumption about 
population growth?  True, one might respond that this assumption was held only 
by some and not by everyone, and so should not affect the construction of the 
Constitution any more than would a failure of basic assumptions by one party to a 
contract but not the other.  Suppose, however, that everyone who thought about it 
really would have said, “Well yes, I guess the South will grow faster than the 
North.  I don’t much like the political ramifications of this, but I suppose I do 
assume it will happen.”  Should this “consensus” about a tacit assumption matter 
here the way it might in contract law?
A consent theorist might try to mitigate the problem by limiting the 
assumptions that can affect constitutional construction to those that were 
universally shared at the time of the text’s adoption.  After all, in contract law, to 
be considered “basic,” an assumption must be shared by all parties to a contract.  
So a consent theorist might argue that the only constitutional assumptions that 
count for purposes of constitutional construction or failure are those that were 
universally held at the time of formation.  Even universally shared assumptions, 
however, do not change the meaning of the Constitution unless they are expressed 
or implied-in-fact from what is expressed, or assist in handling problems of 
ambiguity.  And assumptions that are truly universal will be rare.  Typically there 
were contemporary dissenters from any assumption worth arguing about today.
More importantly, universal assumptions are not the sort of assumptions to 
which consent theorists typically appeal when construing the Constitution beyond 
its express and implied-in-fact meaning.  Rather, they more typically make claims 
about the assumptions of the majority who adopted the text that parallel their 
claims about majoritarian consent to governance.  But, just as the consent of the 
majority does not bind a dissenting minority—who did not previously consent to 
majority rule—the assumptions held by a majority do not bind anyone.  Not, at 
least, without a theoretical justification for majoritarian consent to governance 
that has yet to be produced.
To salvage the consent theory of legitimacy from myriad difficulties 
surrounding constitutional assumptions, a consent theorist might deny that such 
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assumptions are binding.  However consent to governance occurs, a consent 
theory might contend that unstated assumptions are simply no part of the consent 
that legitimates the Constitution; that the only meaning to which the public 
consented was the public meaning of the text—whether express or implied-in-
fact—not any unstated background assumptions, even if those assumptions were
widespread.  
Assuming this move is consistent with a consent theory, which I doubt, 
any consent theorist who makes it is estopped from construing the Constitution 
today according to any basic assumption that was not expressed in the text or 
implied-in-fact.  For example, even if everyone alive at the time the Fourteenth 
Amendment was enacted assumed that blacks were inferior to whites and women 
inferior to men—assumptions certainly not shared by all blacks and women who 
comprised a portion of the people—this assumption should not be used to 
construe the Constitution.  Neither could unstated assumptions about expected 
applications of the text to future cases and controversies.  For example, suppose 
that everyone alive assumed that the Fourteenth Amendment would not 
undermine the constitutionality of segregated schools or the common law of 
coverture.  If the public meaning of the words of the Constitution have this 
unexpected legal affect, the original expected application would not undermine 
this conclusion.  
Put another way, the original pubic meaning of the words of the 
Constitution—both expressed and implied—is what is enacted.  And this enacted 
meaning is distinct from the original assumed or expected application of this 
meaning to particular cases.  True, evidence of original assumptions or 
expectations might rightly influence a historical inquiry into the public meaning 
of the chosen language.  Draftsmen try to use language the public meaning of 
which reflects their intentions.  But sometimes draftsmen use language to obscure 
their intentions, as they arguably did with respect to slavery by employing 
euphemisms instead of the word “slavery” itself.80  When they deliberately speak 
ambiguously or vaguely, they cannot expect their unenacted intentions to carry 
the force of enacted law.  
Bear in mind that, at this point, we are hypothesizing that a consent 
theorist is abandoning adherence to basic assumptions or expectations in order to 
salvage the consent theory of legitimacy.  If they make this move, however, they
must then tell us how the Constitution is to be construed when its meaning runs 
out, as it frequently does when being applied to particular cases and controversies.  
                                                
80 I discuss this example at greater length infra in the text section.
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While some consent theorists may have no problem articulating a nonconsensual 
approach to constitutional construction, this may prove difficult for those who 
wish to limit the “discretion” of judges by relying, for example, on the “intentions 
of the Framers” to fill gaps in the original public meaning of the text.81  If reliance 
on constitutional assumptions is forgone, then along with it goes any appeal to 
original intentions.  Conversely, invoking original intentions to fill the gaps in the 
meaning of the text brings back all the difficulties attending to constitutional 
assumptions: whose nontextual assumptions bind?  What nontextual assumptions 
bind?  Why do nontextual assumptions bind?
B.  The Advantages of a Justice-Based Theory of Constitutional Legitimacy
The first step to addressing the problem of constitutional legitimacy is to 
acknowledge openly that the laws enacted pursuant to the Constitution will be 
imposed on those who have never consented to the Constitution.  What, if 
anything, could justify governance of those persons who have not consented?  As 
noted above, a constitutional regime is legitimate when it has this binding quality 
and illegitimate if it does not. 
By “legitimacy,” I am not referring to whether a particular law is “valid” 
because it was enacted according to the accepted legal process.  Nor do I equate 
the legitimacy of a law with its propriety or “justice”—though these two concepts 
are closely related—or with the perception that a particular law is proper or just. 
Rather, the concept of legitimacy employed here refers to whether a validly 
enacted law merits the benefit of the doubt and a prima facie duty of obedience.
“Legitimacy” is sometimes used to refer to whether a particular legal 
regime is accepted as binding by the public or some substantial portion thereof.  
While public acquiescence may be essential to establishing a constitution as 
positive law, the question of legitimacy with which I am concerned is whether this 
perception is warranted; or, put another way, whether a constitution or legal 
regime ought to be accepted as binding.  The concept of legitimacy I am 
describing is therefore normative, not descriptive.
According to my usage, a valid law could be illegitimate and a legitimate 
law could be unjust.  A law may be “valid” because it was produced in 
accordance with all procedures required by a particular lawmaking system, but be 
“illegitimate” because these procedures were inadequate to provide assurances 
                                                
81 See, e.g. Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional 
Interpretation, __ NW. U. L. REV. ____ (2009).
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that a law is just.  Such a law would not be binding in conscience.  A law might 
be “legitimate” because it was produced according to procedures that assure that it 
is just, and yet be “unjust” because in this case the procedures, which can never 
be perfect, have failed.  Such a law would be binding in conscience unless its 
injustice is somehow established.
While actual consent by the governed, where it exists, could make a 
system of governance legitimate, in the absence of actual consent, a legitimate 
lawmaking process is one that provides adequate assurances that the laws it 
imposes on those who have not consented are just.  If a lawmaking process 
provides these assurances, then it is “legitimate” and the commands it issues are 
entitled to a benefit of the doubt.  Although this nonconsensual justice-based 
concept of constitutional legitimacy is independent of any particular conception of 
justice, to evaluate the legitimacy of an actual constitution requires one employ a 
particular conception of justice.
Elsewhere, I have employed a rights-based conception of justice.82  I 
contend that persons cannot complain about a law being applied to them without 
their consent if such laws are “proper” in that they not violate their rights; and 
such laws would merit a duty of obedience if they are “necessary” to protect the 
rights of others.  Just as one has a duty to respect the rights of others, one has a 
duty to obey the rules that are necessary to respect the rights of others.  For 
example, it does not matter if a murderer has consented to the law prohibiting 
murder.  He cannot complain when a murder statute is imposed upon him because 
the prohibition on murder does not violate his rights; and he has a duty to obey 
such a law because it is necessary to protect the rights of others, which he has a 
duty to respect.  .
A justice-based alternative to a consent theory of legitimacy also addresses 
the vexatious problem of constitutional assumptions when engaged in 
constitutional construction.  To see how, consider the way this theory was 
advanced by its earliest proponent, radical abolitionist and legal theorist Lysander 
Spooner, who developed it as part of his influential critique of the 
constitutionality of slavery83 and refined it during his debate with abolitionist 
                                                
82See BARNETT, supra note 58, at 32–52.  I greatly elaborate and defend the rights-based 
conception of justice upon which my writings on constitutional legitimacy is based in RANDY E.
BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW (1998).  I do not claim to 
have established that this rights-based alternative to a consent theory of constitutional legitimacy 
is exclusive.  Perhaps other alternatives can also be justified.
83See LEWIS PERRY, RADICAL ABOLITIONISM: ANARCHY AND THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD IN 
ANTISLAVERY THOUGHT 195 (1973) (describing Spooner’s essay as “influential” and discussing 
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Wendell Phillips.84  Whereas Spooner contended that the Constitution did not 
sanction slavery, 85 Phillips contended that it did.86  The challenge for both sides 
of this debate was dealing with the language of the Constitution that appeared to 
reference slavery, but that did so euphemistically rather than referring to the 
practice by its proper name.  What, if any, interpretive significance attaches to the 
refusal to refer expressly to “slavery” as such?
Phillips claimed that the newly released Madison papers established that 
the Framers of the Constitution intended to protect slavery in various clauses that 
do not mention slavery by name, so these euphemistic provisions should be given 
their intended meaning.87   Spooner replied that we were not bound by the 
“secret” intentions of the Framers but only by the “innocent” public meaning of 
the words they put into the text.  “It is not the intentions that men actually had,” 
Spooner contended, “but the intentions they constitutionally expressed, that make 
up the constitution.”88
The people certainly did not consent to be bound by Madison’s secret 
notes of the Convention.  Spooner refers to these as “meagre [sic] snatches of 
argument, intent or opinion, uttered by a few only of the members; jotted down by 
one of them, (Mr. Madison,) merely for his own convenience, or from the 
suggestions of his own mind; and only reported to us fifty years afterwards by a 
posthumous publication of his papers.”89  He then asks, “Did Mr. Madison, when 
he took his oath of office, as President of the United States, swear to support these 
scraps of debate, which he had filed away among his private papers?—Or did he 
swear to support that written instrument, which the people of the country had 
agreed to, and which was known to them, and to all the world, as the constitution 
of the United States?”90
How then is the Constitution’s meaning to be determined?  “[T]he only 
answer that can be given,” Spooner concluded, “is, that it can be no other than the 
                                                                                                                                    
the degree of its influence). 
84See id. at 165 (describing how Phillips was “[g]oaded by charges that he was afraid to tackle 
the most famous antislavery analysis of the Constitution—Lysander Spooner’s The 
Unconstitutionality of Slavery”).
85LYSANDER SPOONER, THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY 226 (rev. ed. 1860) in 1 THE 
COLLECTED WORKS OF LYSANDER SPOONER (Charles Shively, ed. 1971).  
86See WENDELL PHILLIPS, THE CONSTITUTION: A PRO-SLAVERY COMPACT: OR SELECTIONS 
FROM THE MADISON PAPERS (1844).
87See id. at 3-7.
88Spooner, supra note 92, at 226.
89Id. at 117.
90Id. 
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meaning which its words, interpreted by sound legal rules of interpretation, 
express.  That and that alone is the meaning of the constitution.”91  In other words, 
the meaning of the text is limited to its express and implied-in-fact content.  
“[W]hether the people who adopted the constitution really meant the same things 
which the constitution means, is a matter which they were bound to settle, each 
individual with himself, before he agreed to the instrument; and it is therefore one 
with which we have now nothing to do.”92
Assuming that the Constitution was initially based on the consent of the 
governed, “[w]e must admit that the constitution, of itself, independently of the 
actual intentions of the people, expresses some certain fixed, definite, and legal 
intentions; else the people themselves would express no intentions by agreeing to 
it.”93  Unless the text of the Constitution had an objective public meaning 
independent of the subjective intentions of its authors, there was nothing to which 
the people could have consented.  “The instrument would, in fact, contain nothing 
that the people could agree to.  Agreeing to an instrument that had no meaning of 
its own, would only be agreeing to nothing.”94
Consider this claim in the context of contract law.  Suppose a written 
contract means only what its drafter intended but did not objectively manifest to 
                                                
91Id. at 223.  Spooner thought that general rules of interpretation were needed to choose 
among the various meanings of language:
[T]he same words have such various and opposite meanings in common 
use, that there would be no certainty as to the meaning of the laws themselves, 
unless there were some rules for determining which one of a word’s various 
meanings was to be attached to it, when the word was found in a particular 
connection. . . .  Their office is to determine the legal meaning of a word, or, 
rather, to select the legal meaning of [a] word, out of all the various meanings 
which the word bears in common use.
Id. at 162.  But the rules of interpretation must themselves be selected to enhance the fit between 
constitutional meaning and justice, for “unless the meaning of words were judged of in this 
manner, words themselves could not be used in writing laws and contracts, without being liable to 
be perverted to subserve all manner of injustice. . . .”  Id. at 163.  “[T]he rules are but a transcript 
of a common principle of morality, to wit, the principle which requires us to attribute good 
motives and good designs to all the words and actions of our fellow-men, that can reasonably bear 
such a construction.”  Id. at 164.
92Id. 
93Id. at 222.
94Id.; see also id. at 220 (“[I]f the intentions could be assumed independently of the words, the 
words would be of no use, and the laws of course would not be written.”).
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the other party.  How can the other party know to what they are consenting unless 
they have access to the subjective intentions of the drafter?  For this reason, 
contract law adopts the objective meaning of the text as the operative meaning of 
a contract unless it can be shown that both parties were in subjective agreement 
about an idiosyncratic meaning of the text.  Assuming that the Constitution was 
based on the consent of the governed, Spooner’s denial that the intentions of the 
Framers are binding rested on the same considerations that lead contract law to 
reject enforcing subjective intentions that are not objectively manifested to the 
other party.  
But Spooner then denied the existence of actual consent.  Although he 
accepted the proposition that the “government can have no powers except as 
individuals may rightfully delegate to it,”95 he shifts the theory from actual 
consent to what philosophers call “hypothetical” consent.  Although the 
Constitution purports to be established by “the people,” and that “all the people” 
consent to it, “this consent of ‘the people’ exists only in theory.  It has no 
existence in fact.  Government is in reality established by the few; and these few 
assume the consent of all the rest, without any such consent being actually 
given.”96
From the lack of actual consent, Spooner posits a presumption based on 
what today might be called rational choice.  “Justice is evidently the only 
principle that everybody can be presumed to agree to, in the formation of 
government.”97 He then compares these presumed intentions of the people, which
“are all uniform, all certainly right, and all valid, because they correspond 
precisely with what they said by the instrument itself,” 98 with the indeterminacy 
of ascertaining the actual intentions of dispersed persons, which are “infinitely 
various, conflicting with each other, conflicting with what they said by the 
instrument, and therefore of no legal consequence or validity whatever.” 99
In other words, because the consent on which the Constitution purports to 
be based is only “theoretical” or “presumed,” we cannot assume that any of the 
persons upon whom its governance is imposed coercively would have consented 
to a text that violated their fundamental rights.  While it is true that persons can 
and do consent to alienate or waive their rights every day, in the absence of actual 
                                                
95Id. at 14.
96Id. at 153.  See also id. at 225 (“The whole matter of the adoption of the constitution is 
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97Id. at 143. 
98Id.
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consent—whether expressed or implied-in-fact—no one can be presumed to have 
done so.  Therefore, any government who depends for its legitimacy on the 
consent of the governed must operate consistently with principles of justice, 
principles to which everybody could presumably agree.  
It bears emphasis that, despite his repeated references to consent, because 
Spooner’s approach is based on hypothetical rather than actual consent, it is 
justice-based and not consent-based.  Then, as now, hypothetical consent is a 
device for determining the proper content and scope of justice.  It is not to be 
confused with arguments that justify coercion that are based on actual consent.
Having employed the concept of presumed consent to shift the focus from 
actual consent to justice, Spooner then presented a principle of construction 
adopted from the following “clear statement” requirement of statutory 
construction enunciated by Chief Justice John Marshall in the 1805 case of United 
States v. Fisher:100 “Where rights are infringed, where fundamental principles are 
overthrown, where the general system of laws is departed from, the legislative 
intention must be expressed with irresistible clearness, to induce a court of justice 
to suppose a design to effect such objects.”101  In the constitutional sphere, 
Spooner rendered this clear statement maxim of construction as follows:
1st, that no intention, in violation of natural justice and natural 
right . . . can be ascribed to the constitution, unless that intention 
be expressed in terms that are legally competent to express such an 
intention; and 2d, that no terms, except those that are plenary, 
express, explicit, distinct, unequivocal, and to which no other 
meaning can be given, are legally competent to authorize or 
sanction anything contrary to natural right.102  
In short, “all language must be construed ‘strictly’ in favor of natural right.”103
Given its origins in considerations of justice, this rule of construction is 
not symmetrical.  “The rule of law is materially different as to the terms necessary 
to legalize and sanction anything contrary to natural right, and those necessary to 
legalize things that are consistent with natural right.” 104  These two rules of law 
                                                
100United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. [2 Cranch] 358, 390 (1805).
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are distinguished by two approaches to constitutional implicature.  Laws that are 
consistent with natural right “may be sanctioned by natural implication and 
inference.”  Laws that are contrary to natural right are sanctioned “only by 
inevitable implication, or by language that is full, definite, express, explicit, 
unequivocal, and whose unavoidable import is to sanction the specific wrong
intended.”105   
The bulk of The Unconstitutionality of Slavery’s nearly 300 pages is an 
examination of the innocent public meaning of the clauses that we have come to 
think of as referring to slavery: the references to “other persons” in Article 1, § 2, 
the “importation of such Persons” in Article I, § 9, and “No person held to Service 
or Labour” in Article IV, § 2.106  Spooner contended that, if you were completely 
unaware of its prior existence, you would not imagine these passages referred to 
slavery.  
Before concluding that Spooner’s innocent interpretation of each of these 
passages is “strained,” consider that Phillips contended that two additional clauses 
of the Constitution were also references to slavery: “Congress shall have Power . . 
. to suppress Insurrections”;107 and “The United States . . . shall protect each 
[state] . . . against domestic Violence.”108  Phillips argued that these “articles 
relating to insurrection and domestic violence, perfectly innocent in themselves—
yet being made with the fact directly in view that Slavery exists among us, do 
deliberately pledge the whole national force against the unhappy slave if he 
imitate our fathers and resist oppression.”109  Whose interpretation of the text is 
“strained”?
What light does this debate over slavery between Lysander Spooner and 
Wendell Phillips shed on constitutional interpretation and construction?  In my 
view, Spooner offers an effective critique of Phillips’ assertion that the general 
language of the Constitution must be interpreted according to Framers’ intent, and 
identifies the powerful alternative of original public meaning.  But the rest of his 
theoretical apparatus raise a series of difficult questions.  Is not the constitutional 
language about which he and Phillips are debating ambiguous—as opposed to 
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106I summarize Spooner’s extensive analysis of each of these clauses in Randy E. Barnett,
Was Slavery Before the Thirteenth Amendment?: Lysander Spooner’s Theory of Interpretation, 28 
PACIFIC L. J. 977, 994–99 (1997).
107U.S. CONST., ART. I, § 8.
108U.S. CONST., ART. IV, § 4.
109WENDELL PHILLIPS, REVIEW OF LYSANDER SPOONER’S ESSAY ON THE 
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vague?  If so, then are not the background assumptions of the public relevant to 
determining the original public meaning of the text?  And would not a reasonable 
member of the public realize that these passages refer, however euphemistically, 
to slavery?  If so, was not Phillips ultimately correct to utilize evidence of 
Framers’ intent to resolve the ambiguous text and establish the true public 
meaning of the text, and was not Spooner wrong to reject such evidence?  If all 
this is correct, then is it not Spooner’s clear statement principle of construction, 
rather than his “strained” interpretations of the text, that is really doing the work 
in reaching his conclusion that slavery was unconstitutional?  
These questions summarize the commonly-held view that, however 
euphemistically they may have been worded, the public meanings of these 
passages of the Constitution sanctioned slavery.  The Framers’ intention to protect 
slavery was no secret that was unknown to the general public.  A reasonable 
person would have read some or all of these provisions as referring to slavery, 
notwithstanding their normal innocent meanings.  On the other hand, are there no 
interpretive consequences of the drafters’ refusal to use “the name of the thing, 
alleged to be sanctioned”110 when the term “slavery” was widely known and 
available?  Did their deliberate selection of neutral language, whatever their 
motive for this choice, have no interpretive consequences?  
The analysis of interpretation vs. construction and ambiguity vs. 
vagueness presented in Part II, however, provides an important argument on 
behalf of Spooner’s position: Because the Framers chose to refer euphemistically 
to slavery rather than use the word “slavery” itself, they injected an irreducible 
ambiguity into the text of the Constitution.  It is not only possible but likely that, 
while most reasonable people may have assumed that these passages referred to 
slavery, significant numbers of other reasonable persons did not.  As Spooner 
observed:
If the instrument had contained any tangible sanction of slavery, 
the people, in some parts of the country certainly, would sooner 
have it burned by the hand of the common hangman, than they 
would have adopted it, and thus sold themselves as pimps to 
slavery, covered as they were with the scars they had received in 
fighting the battles of freedom.111
                                                
110SPOONER, supra note 88, at 59.
111Id. at 119.
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As much as they wished to mollify the pro-slavery states, so too did the Framers
wish to avoid riling those who vehemently opposed slavery.  “[T]he members of 
the convention knew that such was the feeling of a large portion of the people; 
and for that reason, if for no other, they dared insert in the instrument no legal 
sanction of slavery.”112  Hence their deliberate use of ambiguity.  
Or perhaps more accurately, a reasonable person could have taken the
choice to employ ambiguous phraseology in the text as an implicit refusal to 
sanction slavery in the Constitution while textually accommodating its continued 
existence for the time being.  At minimum, those who opposed slavery could view 
these irreducibly ambiguous passages as consistent with an anti-slavery 
construction when political circumstances would allow.  At a maximum, given the 
irreducible ambiguity of these passages, each person was entitled to rely on the 
innocent reading of the text, even of everyone else “knew” what was really 
intended.
“If there were a single honest man in the nation, who assented, in good 
faith, to the honest and legal meaning of the constitution,” wrote Spooner, “it 
would be unjust and unlawful towards him to change the meaning of the 
instrument so as to sanction slavery, even though every other man in the nation 
should testify that, in agreeing to the constitution, he intended that slavery should 
be sanctioned.”113 Is this hyperbole?  Not if an irreducible ambiguity resulted
from the use of euphemisms when the very reason for avoiding the more accurate 
language was the moral odiousness of what those who wrote the text refused to 
call by its proper name.
Ultimately, it does not matter why the Framers injected an irreducible 
ambiguity into the Constitution; it is enough that they did so.  Their deliberate use 
of ambiguous language gives rise to the same need for constitutional construction 
based on one’s theory of constitutional legitimacy that typically arises when the 
meaning of a constitutional term is vague.  And this is exactly what Spooner’s 
clear statement rule of construction based on his commitment to natural rights 
provides: a way to choose among the several senses of the words of the text, the 
context of which renders them irreducibly ambiguous.
I admit to vacillating over the years about whether Spooner’s argument 
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was successful or not.114  Despite its visceral appeal, I leaned against the ultimate 
correctness of Spooner’s conclusion about the public meaning of the apparently 
pro-slavery provisions of the text—until developing the analysis of the proper role 
of background constitutional assumptions for this article.  For what it is worth, I 
now lean towards the view that Spooner was insightfully cognizant of  the 
problem of irresolvable ambiguity engendered by the deliberate use of 
euphemisms in place of the precise term “slavery” that was readily available.  If 
such was the case, constitutional construction is warranted, and the sort of 
construction proposed by Spooner enhances the legitimacy of the Constitution. 
That Spooner’s argument seems “strained” to us or worse is a product of 
what we all think we know to have been the intentions of the Framers of the 
Constitution, as well as the background assumptions of the vast bulk of the 
American public, concerning the continuation of slavery.  But our knowledge 
needs to be balanced against what we also know to be true:  the Framers had 
multiple compelling motivations of both principle and political expediency for 
omitting any express reference to “slavery.”  In short, our powerful intuition about 
what the Framers really meant is potentially negated by the deliberate ambiguity
of what they really said.    
IV.  THREE EXAMPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL ASSUMPTIONS
In Part III, I contended that a consent theory of constitutional legitimacy 
seems to require the identification and enforcement of constitutional assumptions 
because such assumptions condition the parties’ original consent to the 
Constitution or amendment.  This greatly compounds the conceptual and practical 
problems with a consent theory: identifying whose consent and assumptions 
matter, ascertaining just what those assumptions might be, and justifying binding 
those alive today by the conditioned consent of past groups.  By contrast, a 
justice-based conception of legitimacy, while not without its own problems, offers 
substantial conceptual and practical advantages.  Conceptually, by honestly 
acknowledging that the laws emanating from the constitutional structure are 
imposed on nonconsenting persons, the real issue that must be confronted is what, 
if anything, justifies such coercion.  Framing the question this way identifies what 
is really at issue when considering the legitimacy of the Constitution today, or at 
any time in the past: the justice of imposing governance on the people who have 
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not consented.
Let me now apply the framework developed here to three issues.  The first 
concerns the protection of unenumerated rights.  Such rights were certainly 
assumed to exist at the time the Constitution was enacted.  While this assumption 
is operative, it is only because it is implicated by what the Constitution says.  In 
other words, the bare fact that it was a background constitutional assumption is 
irrelevant to why it is a part of the original public meaning of the Constitution.  
The second is the assumption that states have what is called a police power.  
Because the Constitution says nothing about the police powers of states, whether 
this assumption is pertinent to deciding constitutional cases and controversies is 
entirely a matter of constitutional construction.  As such, the scope of any 
constructive doctrine of the police power may be limited by what the Constitution 
does say.  The third is the recent claim that the original public meaning of the text 
includes the methods of constitutional interpretation and construction that those 
who adopted the text might have assumed courts would employ thereafter.  This 
proposal confuses constitutional meaning with assumptions or expectations about 
methods of constitutional application that are no part of the original meaning of 
the constitution.
A.  Assumptions About the Natural Rights Retained by the People  
In addition to the rights that are enumerated in the Constitution, the Ninth 
Amendment refers to other rights “retained by the people”115 that are applicable to 
the federal government, while the Fourteenth Amendment bars states from 
abridging the “privileges or immunities of citizens.”116  In Part I, I explained how 
the Ninth Amendment implies (a) the existence of other rights retained by the 
people in addition to those that are enumerated, and (b) a prohibition on their 
denial or disparagement.
Elsewhere I have provided evidence that the original meaning of the 
phrase “rights . . .  retained by the people” is a reference to natural rights, which is 
synonymous with liberty rights; and that the original meaning of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause combines the “immunities” of natural rights with the 
additional “privileges” afforded citizens of the United States, in particular the 
positive rights included in the first eight amendments.117  While this is not the 
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place to review this evidence, it establishes that the original public meaning of the 
Ninth Amendment was not as open-ended as is sometimes assumed.  It refers to 
natural rights.  And natural rights, in turn, means “liberty rights” —that is, the 
right to take or refrain from taking action that does not violate the rights of others.  
The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects these 
“immunities” along with additional “privileges” created by the Constitution itself.
In this regard, Justice Holmes was wrong to say that “the Constitution 
does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics,”118 by which he was 
obliquely referring to Spencer’s “law of equal freedom.”119  Holmes’s sarcastic 
reference to a very popular Nineteenth Century English writer was something of a 
cheap shot, given that Spencer’s views on this issue were indistinguishable from 
those of John Locke and the Founders, as well as those who wrote the Fourteenth 
Amendment.120  Moreover, it is clear that Spencer was indeed describing natural 
rights that are retained by the people.121  And it is also clear that the recognition 
                                                                                                                                    
evidence of the original meaning of the Ninth Amendment and critically evaluating rival models 
of original meaning).
118 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
119 HERBERT SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS 95 (1954) (originally published in 1850).  The entire 
book provides justifications of this “first principle” as well as an examination of its implications 
for governance.  See, e.g., id. at 69:
This, however, is not the right of one but of all. All are endowed with faculties. 
All are bound to fulfil the Divine will by exercising them.  All therefore must be 
free to do those things in which the exercise of them consists.  That is, all must
have rights to liberty of action.
And hence there necessarily arises a limitation.  For if men have like 
claims to that freedom which is needful for the exercise of their faculties, then 
must the freedom of each be bounded by the similar freedom of all.  When, in 
the pursuit of their respective ends, two individuals clash, the movements of the 
one remain free only in so far as they do not interfere with the like movements 
of the other.  This sphere of existence into which we are thrown not affording 
room for the unrestrained activity of all, and yet all possessing in virtue of their 
constitutions similar claims to such unrestrained activity, there is no course but 
to apportion out the unavoidable restraint equally.  Wherefore we arrive at the 
general proposition, that every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his 
faculties compatible with the possession of like liberty by every other man.
120Indeed, Social Statics was quoted with approval in Congress before the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. In 1866, two Congressmen offered its “law of equal freedom” in support 
of a statute granting universal male suffrage in the District of Columbia without regard to race. See 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 304 (1866)(statement of Rep. Clarke)(quoting Social Statics); 
and CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. 76 (1867)(statement of Rep. Brown)(same).
121When Spencer wrote that “[t]here exists . . . a dominant sect of so-called philosophical 
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and protection of these liberty rights is consistent with the prohibition of wrongful 
behavior violating the rights of others, and the regulation of rightful behavior to 
prevent rights violations from occurring.  Indeed, the Bake Shop Act at issue in 
Lochner contained elaborate health and safety regulations of bakeries that were 
neither challenged by the defendant nor questioned by the Court.
Had the Ninth Amendment and Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment not been included in the text of the Constitution, the 
Constitution would be silent about the nature of any rights that may have been 
retained by the people, and the existence and scope of such rights would be 
entirely a matter of constitutional construction.  As it is, however, any 
construction of the Constitution must be consistent with what the original 
meaning of the Constitution implies about unenumerated rights: the Constitution 
may not be construed to deny and disparage these other rights, even to protect 
rights that others today think are more important.  In short, the existence of 
background natural rights retained by the people is a constitutional assumption 
that is hard-wired into the meaning of the Constitution itself.122  Whether the 
judicial recognition and protection of these rights is sufficient to render the 
Constitution legitimate is a separate matter that is beyond the scope of this 
Article.123
B.  Assumptions About the Police Power of States
While the Constitution enumerates the powers of the federal government, 
it says little about those of the states.  Article I, § 10 places restrictions on the 
power of states to lay imposts or duties on imports and exports,124 perhaps 
                                                                                                                                    
politicians who treat with contempt this belief that men have any claims antecedent to those 
endorsed by governments” (id. at 86) he could well have been referring to judges like Holmes.  ..
122Similarly, the assumption that a “well regulated militia [is] . . .  necessary to the security of 
a free State” is also hard wired into the text itself. See U.S. Const. Amend. II.
123Suppose a “welfare right” to some minimum level of material support is also requisite to 
constitutional legitimacy.  If so, a regime based on a written constitution that did not recognize 
such a right expressly or by implication could still be legitimate if that constitution allows the 
government to exercise a discretionary power to provide such support and the government then 
does so.  So it could be that, when the discretionary powers of the federal and state governments 
are constitutionally exercised to provide in practice what the text does not mandate, then the 
resultant regime could be legitimate despite a failure of the Constitution to require what is being 
provided as a matter of discretion.
124 See U.S. CONST. Art. I, §10 (“No state shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any 
imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's 
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implying the existence of the power to lay duties on purely internal activities.  To 
the express limitations provided by Article I, § 10 can be added the implicit 
limitation on the powers of states entailed by the Congress’s power to regulate 
commerce among the several states.  The Tenth Amendment is entirely 
noncommittal about whether “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution” are “reserved to the states” or whether they are reserved “to the
people,” although it certainly implies the continued existence of states in much 
the same way as the Ninth Amendment implies the existence of natural rights.125  
That the existence of state police powers was a background assumption of 
the original Constitution is clear.  The concept of a police power can be traced to 
the same Lockean natural rights theory on which the Ninth Amendment and 
Privileges or Immunities Clause were based.  In the prepolitical “state of nature” 
people are in possession of all their natural rights, including the right to execute or 
enforce their rights against other persons.  “[I]n the state of Nature,” wrote Locke, 
“every one has the Executive Power of the Law of Nature.”126  However, in such a 
state, it can be objected that “it is unreasonable for Men to be Judges in their own 
Cases, that Self-love will make Men partial to themselves and their Friends.  And 
on the other side, that Ill Nature, Passion and Revenge will carry them too far in 
punishing others.”127  For this reason, “nothing but Confusion and Disorder will 
follow,” and government is needed “to restrain the partiality and violence of 
Men.”128
For Locke, civil government is justified to rectify the three inconveniences 
in the state of nature that correspond to the legislative, judicial, and executive 
branches of government: First, “the want of an establish’d, settled, known Law, 
received and allowed by common consent to be the Standard of Right and Wrong, 
and the common measure to decide all Controversies between them”129; second,
the want of “a known and indifferent Judge, with Authority to determine all 
differences according to the established Law”130; and, third, the want of the 
“Power to back and support the Sentence when right, and to give it due 
                                                                                                                                    
inspection laws”).
125U.S. CONST. amend. X. (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the 
people.”).
126JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 316 (Peter Laslett ed., 1963).
127Id.
128Id.
129Id. at 396. 
130Id. (emphasis in original).
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Execution.”131 Therefore, “whoever has the legislative or Supream Power of any 
Common-wealth, is bound to govern by establish’d Standing Laws, promulgated 
and known to the People, and not by Extemporary Decrees; by indifferent and 
upright Judges, who are to decide Controversies by those Laws; And to imploy 
the force of the Community at home, only in the Execution of such Laws. . . .”132
According to Lockean political theory, then, the people form government 
to secure their rights of liberty and property more effectively than they can secure
them on their own.  In this way, Lockean theory provides both a powerful 
rationale for and an important limit upon the powers of government that is 
reflected in the police power doctrine. The police power is the legitimate authority 
of states to regulate rightful and prohibit wrongful acts.
While a police power of states is nowhere expressed in the Constitution, 
its existence may well implicated by what the Constitution says.  In particular, the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee that no state shall “deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”133 may presuppose a state power 
of “protection.”  Whether or not its existence is implied, the scope of any state 
police power is entirely a constitutional construction.  The exact contours of 
whatever power was assumed power at the founding are hazy at least in part 
because there was no need to address the question when the Constitution was 
enacted.  With a few exceptions, the scope of state powers was a matter of state 
constitutional law. 
With the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment’s new restrictions on 
states, there arose an imperative to define the scope of their police powers more 
clearly.  The same year that the Amendment was enacted, Justice Thomas Cooley 
of the Michigan Supreme Court and a professor of law at the University of 
Michigan published, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest 
Upon the Legislative Power of the United States of the American Union.134  In this 
work, he offered a construction of the police power of states to address both the 
“conflict between national and State authority” and the question of “whether the 
State exceeds its just powers in dealing with the property and restraining the 
actions of individuals.”135
Cooley’s construction of the police power is premised on the need to 
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protect the equal rights of the citizenry.  “The police of a State, in a 
comprehensive sense, embraces its system of internal regulation,”136  According 
to Cooley, the proper end of this internal regulation was two-fold.  First, it sought 
“to preserve the public order and to prevent offences against the State.”137  
Second, it sought “to establish for the intercourse of citizen with citizen . . . rules 
of good manners and good neighborhood.”138  The latter end was to be achieved 
in a manner sounding much like Spencer’s law of equal freedom.  These rules  
“are calculated to prevent a conflict of rights, and to insure to each the 
uninterrupted enjoyment of his own, so far as is reasonably consistent with a like 
enjoyment of rights by others.”139.
After Cooley, the leading nineteenth-century theorist of the police power 
was Professor Christopher Tiedeman.  In his 1886 Treatise on the Limitations of 
Police Power in the United States, Tiedeman began his explanation of the police 
power and its limits with the concept of “private” rights:  “The private rights of 
the individual, apart from a few statutory rights, which when compared with the 
whole body of private rights are insignificant in number, do not rest upon the 
mandate of municipal law as a source.”140  According to Tiedeman, these private 
rights that are recognized in civil society are none other than natural rights.  
“They belong to man in a state of nature; they are natural rights, rights recognized 
and existing in the law of reason”141
Like Locke, Tiedeman then defined the legitimate purpose of government 
as the protection of these rights.  “The object of government is to impose that 
degree of restraint upon human actions, which is necessary to the uniform and 
reasonable conservation and enjoyment of private rights.  Government and 
municipal law protect and develop, rather than create, private rights.”142
Government protects and develops these rights by preventing people from 
violating the rights of others: “The conservation of private rights is attained by the 
imposition of a wholesome restraint upon their exercise, such a restraint as will 
prevent the infliction of injury upon others in the enjoyment of them. . . .  The 
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power of the government to impose this restraint is called POLICE POWER.”143
Elsewhere I have discussed the proper scope of the police power at greater 
length than is necessary here.144  The question I now wish to address is what 
theoretical role, if any, should be played by constitutional assumptions about the 
scope of the police power.  There are two assumptions with which I am 
concerned.  The first is the assumption that the scope of the police power includes 
the protection of individual rights.  The second is that the police power also 
includes the regulation of private morality.
That the scope of the police power includes the protection of individual 
rights seems consistent with, if not implicated by, the text of the Constitution.  
First and foremost, it is consistent with the original meaning of the Ninth 
Amendment’s implication that there are natural individual liberty rights that shall 
not be denied or disparaged.  Second, it is consistent with the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that extends federal jurisdiction 
to protect these unenumerated natural rights or “immunities” from state laws.  In 
addition, the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition against a state “deny[ing] to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”145 implicates 
the existence of an underlying duty of government to provide the “protection” of 
the laws.  In other words, either the protection of individual rights is implied by 
the text of the Constitution, or any construction that allowed a state to deny or 
disparage the retained rights or immunities of citizens, and that failed to provide 
the protection of the law to every person within its jurisdiction, would contradict 
the text.
The historical claim that the police power of states was assumed also to 
include a power to regulate morality is both far more problematic and much more 
complex.  In his lengthy chapter on the police power, Cooley devoted a single 
paragraph to the “preservation of the public morals” that “is peculiarly subject to 
legislative supervision.”146  In particular, the legislature “may forbid the keeping, 
exhibition, or sale of indecent books or pictures, and cause their destruction if 
seized; or prohibit or regulate the places of amusement that may be resorted to for 
the purposes of gaming; or forbid altogether the keeping and exhibition of 
stallions in public places.”147  To this he added, “the power to provide for the 
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compulsory observance of the first day of the week is also to be referred to the 
same authority.”148
In contrast, Tiedeman devoted a full chapter of his treatise to the “Police 
Control of Morality and Religion.”149  There he distinguished between a crime, 
which is “a trespass upon some right, public or private,”150 and a vice, which 
“consists in an inordinate, and hence immoral, gratification of one’s passions and 
desires.  The primary damage is to one’s self.”151  Although Tiedeman observed 
that persons who are addicted to vices “damage the material interest of society,” 
the “evils to society, flowing from vices, are indirect and remote and do not 
involve trespasses upon rights.”152  Because the police power is “confined to the 
imposition of burdens and restrictions upon the rights of individuals, in order to 
prevent injury to others,” the “moral laws can exact obedience only in foro 
coscientiae.”153  According to Tiedeman, the “municipal law has only to do with 
trespasses.  It cannot be called into play in order to save one from the evil 
consequences of his own vices, for the violation of a right by the actions of 
another must exist or be threatened, in order to justify the interference of law.”154
In addition, the regulation of private morals is analytically distinct from 
that of public morality—that is, the regulation of conduct that takes place in the 
public sphere.  Here the government is acting as the trustee of public property that 
the general public has a right to use and enjoy without unduly interfering with the 
like use and enjoyment by others.  If so-called “lewd and lascivious” conduct 
were permitted in this sphere, adults with typical sensibilities or with children, for 
example, might be unable to use and enjoy the streets and parks.  The regulation 
of “public morality” in public spaces is akin to the time, place, and manner 
regulations of speech and assembly to prevent the exercise of the rights from 
unduly interfering with the rights of other citizens. 
In noting these potential complexities, it is not my purpose to evaluate the 
merits of any of these claims or distinctions.  Much as I doubt that a universal 
assumption existed that states had the power to regulate purely private morality, I 
want to assume, for purposes of argument, that such a belief did indeed exist and 
confine my attention to a single issue: if the power to regulate private morality 
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was assumed to be within the police power of states, does a commitment to 
original meaning of the Constitution commit one to this construction of the scope 
of state powers?  The above analysis suggests why the answer to this question is 
no.
To sum up:  while the existence of a duty by states to protect individual 
rights may well be implicated from what the text of the Constitution says, the 
exact scope of this power of protection is not textually fixed and is open to 
construction.  There is nothing in the text of the Constitution that intimates a 
power of the states to regulate private morality.  Whatever one concludes about 
the legitimacy of punishing persons for engaging in conduct that cannot be 
characterized as violating or threatening the rights of others, it cannot be claimed 
that such a power is part of the original meaning of what the Constitution either 
says or implies.  Therefore, the bare fact that some or all persons alive when the 
Fourteenth Amendment was enacted would have assumed that morals legislation 
was consistent with the Privileges or Immunities Clause does not make it so.  To 
reach this conclusion would require the sort of normative reasoning in which 
Cooley, and especially Tiedeman, engaged.  It is not a matter to be settled 
historically as a matter of original meaning.  
C.  Assumptions About Interpretive Methods
In the absence of actual consent, I have argued that a constitution could 
still be legitimate if it provides procedures to assure that the laws it imposes on a 
non-consenting public are both proper insofar as they do not violate the rights of 
the persons on whom they are imposed and necessary to protect the rights of 
others.  In the abstract, a written constitution can be considered another structural 
feature of governance, like separation of powers, judicial review, and federalism, 
whose value lies in its ability to lock-in and preserve the other rights-protecting 
features of the governing structure, as well as to define and limit the power that 
may properly be exercised.  In this manner, writtenness contributes to 
constitutional legitimacy.  A particular written constitution should be followed if 
the substance of what it says is “good enough” to provide, however imperfectly, 
the procedural assurances that the laws will respect the rights of the persons on 
whom they are imposed.
But the contribution to constitutional legitimacy provided by the 
writtenness of a constitution is seriously compromised where the actors it is 
supposed to bind—namely officials of the federal government, as well as of the 
states—are able on their own to unilaterally amend its meaning to expand their 
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powers.  Equally important, however, because it is not founded upon actual 
consent, the meaning of a written constitution is limited to what it says or implies-
in-fact.  Because, unlike contracts, the Constitution is not based on consent, it is 
not qualified or bounded by the unexpressed assumptions held by those who 
framed or ratified it.  
John O. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport have provided a normative 
argument for original meaning originalism.  They contend that constitutions 
adopted by supermajoritarian mechanisms tend to yield superior consequences 
than those that are adopted by other means, and that these consequences are only 
obtained if the text of such a constitution cannot be changed by anything less than 
supermajoritarian amendment procedures.155  An evaluation of their interesting 
normative defense of supermajoritarian rules and originalism is beyond the scope 
of this paper.
In addition to defending original meaning originalism, however, McGinnis 
and Rappaport go on to advocate what they call “original methods originalism.”156  
They contend that a “desirable constitution enacted under supermajority rules 
should be interpreted according to the methods that the constitution’s enactors 
expected to be applied.”157  Why?  Because the benefits yielded from a 
constitution enacted by supermajoritarian procedures “derives from the consensus 
support it gained among the enactors.”158  And this consensus is based on how 
those supporting the text expected it would be applied.  “In considering whether 
to support the constitution, the enactors would have voted for or against the 
constitution based on how they thought it should be interpreted.” 159  From this 
they contend that “the meaning of the constitution that a supermajority of enactors 
approved as beneficial was based on the methods that the enactors expected to 
apply.”160  They conclude that because “[t]he beneficence of that 
supermajoritarian constitution . . . requires using the original interpretive methods 
of the enactors,” therefore “the appropriate mode of constitutional interpretation is 
‘original methods originalism.’”161
The analysis of constitutional assumptions presented above shows that this 
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argument is flawed.  When a supermajority “approves” a constitution, they are not 
adopting as law their own private intentions or assumptions, or those of others.  
Rather, they are adopting a text that has an objective public meaning.  When 
McGinnis and Rappaport refer to this as “semantic meaning from a philosophic 
standpoint,”162 they are introducing a needless confusion into their analysis.  If 
what they call the “philosophic standpoint” is a correct account of the semantic 
meaning of a public text like a constitution, then this is the actual or empirical
meaning of the text.  Nothing is added to the analysis by labeling the public 
meaning of the text, the “philosophic meaning.”163
By introducing this label, McGinnis and Rappaport are trying to leave 
open the door to some other method of interpretation: the method by which those 
who supported a constitution expected or assumed it would be interpreted or 
applied.  Now in one sense, the original methods originalism can be reduced to 
original public meaning originalism.  By approving a written constitution, those 
who support it can be described as having assumed it will later be interpreted 
according to its public meaning.  It is after all the public meaning they have 
chosen to approve.  If, however, someone who approved the text of the 
constitution assumed that some other method would be used to identify its 
“meaning”—for example, original intent or original expected application—then 
they are assuming that it will be “interpreted” in such a manner as to violate its 
public meaning. 
In short, even if a majority of those who approved a constitution had other 
methods of interpretation in mind, their assumed or expected methods do not 
thereby become a part of the meaning of the text.  So McGinnis and Rappaport’s 
claim that a constitution “should be interpreted according to the methods that the 
constitution’s enactors expected to be applied”164 is needlessly confusing.   It is 
enough to say that those who enact a constitution expect it will be followed or 
interpreted according to its meaning.
CONCLUSION
  For several years, a new and improved originalist approach to 
constitutional interpretation has been on the rise.  This “new originalism”165
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shares with the originalism of the 1980s—and all other forms of originalism—the 
core propositions that (a) the textual meaning of a written constitution is fixed at 
the time its language is enacted, and (b) this fixed meaning should remain the 
same until it is properly changed.166  The intuitive appeal of originalism rests on 
the proposition that the original public meaning is an objective fact that can be 
established by reference to historical materials.  There is a “there” there to be 
discovered by interpreters.  In this Article, I have examined when background 
assumptions are a part of this semantic meaning and when they are not.
Originalists still differ among themselves on the normative basis for 
originalism.  Like most other constitutional theorists, originalists fall into one of 
two normative camps: those who view constitutional legitimacy as flowing from 
the consent of the governed, and those who view constitutional legitimacy as 
founded on considerations of justice. In this Article, I examined how the 
normative disagreement among originalists leads to a divergence in how they
construe a written constitution.  Those who base the legitimacy of a written 
constitution on the consent of the governed are likely to construe it in light of 
prevailing background assumptions at the time of its enactment.  
But this Article is not just for or about originalists.  Because many 
nonoriginalist constitutional scholars share the same misconceived assumption 
about the relevance of background assumptions to original meaning, and because 
they view some of these assumptions as seriously objectionable, they reject 
originalism as morally odious.  When the relationship between original meaning 
and background assumptions is clarified and refined, originalism should become 
far more normatively appealing to those who now consider themselves 
nonoriginalists.  Properly understood, originalism is a commitment to what a 
written constitution says and implies—nothing more and nothing less.
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